INTRODUCTION
In 2003, following a contentious twenty-five year debate, 1 the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of race-based affirmative action in higher education. 2 However, the Court's decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger 3 and Grutter v. Bollinger 4 did not quell the debate regarding race-conscious decision making in higher education. 5 In-stead, they ignited fervent commentary and discourse on numerous issues,' ranging from the constitutionality of minoritytargeted financial aid and recruitment programs 7 to the decisions' applicability (or inapplicability) in the context of elementary and secondary education Much of the scholarly analyses following the cases have examined the Court's opinions themselves and the rationales relied [Vol. 47:1133 upon by the Justices in reaching their holdings. 9 Of particular interest has been Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter, which has spawned criticism from both affirmative action opponents° and proponents. 1 Interestingly, both supporters ject to judicial containment and, eventually, elimination."); Guinier, supra note 1, at 117-18 ("The [Grutter] opinion is a sweet victory for those who have long championed the need to include underrepresented people of color in the educational elite."); Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 191, 193 (2004) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's twenty-five-year time limit is unrealistic due to the detrimental effect of persistent racial inequality). Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."), with id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal oppor-and those opposed to affirmative action have critiqued the opinion for its discussion and application of the constitutional standards necessary to uphold the University of Michigan Law School's ("Law School") plan. 2 For some, one of the most troubling aspects of the opinion concerns the role that deference played in the Court's decision. 3 In upholding the Law School's plan, the Court deferred to university officials' judgments regarding both the benefits derived from a racially diverse student body 4 and also the most effective means by which to assemble such a student population. 1 5 Although the tunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.").
12. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter & Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (asserting that the Court deviated from previous narrow tailoring requirements when it failed to inquire if the Law School "use [d] the minimum necessary racial preference" to meet its diversity goals); Brown-Nagin, supra note 11, at 1478-79 ("[Tlhe Grutter majority fails to cogently explain under what circumstances race-conscious policies should be considered sufficiently narrowly tailored to avoid offending the Constitution."); Crump, supra note 9, at 520-23 (criticizing the Court's narrow tailoring analysis in Grutter for failing to articulate and apply a clear meaning of the constitutional standard); Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 705, 720-32 (2008) (critiquing the diversity rationale as relied upon in Grutter).
13. See, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 12, at 581 n.223 ("The extreme deference that Justice O'Connor showed to state officials is deeply inconsistent with the whole idea of strict scrutiny as an attempt to smoke out unjustified governmental racial preferences."); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029 REV. , 2041 REV. -42 (2011 (critiquing the Grutter opinion for not addressing important factors applicable to a determination to defer to university officials' decision making); Patrick M. Garry, How Strictly Scrutinized?: Examining the Educational Benefits the Court Relied Upon in Grutter, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 649, 654-59 (2008) (questioning the Grutter Court's presumption of "good faith on the part of the Law School when determining that only a certain kind of racially mixed student body can produce certain educational benefits"); Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613 , 1621 -26 (2007 (arguing the Grutter Court attributed institutional deference to the wrong prong of the strict scrutiny inquiry); Thompson & Schiff, supra note 10, at 482 ("Deference to a political body is inconsistent with the holdings of the Supreme Court in Adarand, Croson, and Wygant.") .
14. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."); Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IowA L. REV. 837, 866-69 (2011) ; Berger, supra note 13, at 2041; Crump, supra note 9, at 492-93; Garry, supra note 13, at 654; Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, With Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v. Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1, 31-33 (2009) .
15. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (citation omitted) ("We take the Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable."); id. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's broad deference to both the Law School's judgment that racial aesthetics leads to educational benefits and its stubborn refusal to alter the status quo in admissions methods finds no basis in the Constitution or decisions of this Court."); id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this Court has often respected and deferred to educators' academic decision making in the context of public education, 6 some contend that it is inappropriate to grant such deference when considering the constitutionality of race-based admissions 17 and student assignment plans. 8 This article challenges that contention and argues that affording an appropriate degree of deference to educators' good faith, goal."); see also Adams, supra note 14, at 866 (asserting that the Court deferred to the Law School regarding the means it used to achieve a diverse student body); Berger, supra note 13, at 2041 ("[The Court deferred to the Law School's judgment that diversity was a compelling governmental interest and that the Law School's affirmative action program was narrowly tailored to the achievement of that interest."); id. at 2084 (discussing the Court's deferral to the Law School's admissions program); Crump, supra note 9, at 494 (describing Justice O'Connor's evaluation of "the durational aspect of the Law School's program" as "one of deference"); Killenbeck, supra note 14, at 36 n.235 (asserting that the Court took the Law School "at its word" when accepting the admissions officers' claims that in efforts to assemble a critical mass of minority students they were not engaged in racial balancing).
16. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (noting that judges should greatly respect and not override faculty decisions "unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation."). See generally Amy GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME 22-50 (2009) (discussing the rise of academic deference in American institutions of higher education).
17. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[W] hile the opinion accords a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review."); id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) ("The Court bases its unprecedented deference to the Law School-a deference antithetical to strict scrutiny-on an idea of 'educational autonomy' grounded in the First Amendment. In my view, there is no basis for a right of public universities to do what would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause."); id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference."); id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In the context of university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical data known to us, but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued."); Ayres & Foster, supra note 12, at 581 n.223; Garry, supra note 13, at 654-57; Graglia, supra note 10, at 2047; Thompson & Schiff, supra note 10, at 478. 18. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 744-48 (2007) (plurality opinion) (rejecting arguments to defer to local school boards regarding issues related to the need for race-conscious student assignment plans); id. at 766 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("To adopt the dissent's deferential approach would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities."). But see id. at 848-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to defer to school officials in light of judges' limitations to effectively "act as school administrators"); Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved, No Child Left Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 923-26 (2008) (arguing that the plurality departed from precedent by not deferring to local school districts).
race-based decision making is both consistent with, and called for, under the Court's jurisprudence. This article defends the Court's prior practice of respecting educators' expertise and autonomy, and it urges current Justices to continue this practice when examining future race-based admissions plans, such as that challenged in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. 19 In Fisher, two students who were denied undergraduate admission into the University of Texas at Austin ("UT"), argue that UT's consideration of race in its admissions decisions constitutes an equal protection violation under the Constitution and federal civil rights laws. 2 " Although the UT plan is modeled after the constitutionally-approved plan in Grutter, 21 an examination of its constitutionality is potentially complicated by the operation of the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan ("Ten Percent Plan") 2 2 -an arguably effective, race-neutral alternative. Central to the Court's inquiry in Fisher will be its willingness, or lack thereof, to respect UT's assessment that despite the gains in diversity achieved by the Ten Percent Plan, 24 the consideration of race in admissions decisions continues to be a necessary tool for achieving its academic mission and goals. 2 ' While the Court's willingness to defer to " [t] he Law School's educational judgment" undoubtedly influenced its decision to uphold the Law School's plan in Grutter, 26 a majority of the current Justices have previously indicated their unwillingness to utilize a deferential approach when assessing the constitutionality of educators' race-based decision making." This unwillingness could detrimentally impact not only the future of the UT plan in particular, but also the future of race-based affirmative action in higher education generally.
Therefore, this article urges the Court to respect educators' good faith decision making, particularly when it involves the development of academic missions, as well as the measures needed to accomplish them. Failure to do so would undermine the Court's prior practice of respecting educators' autonomy as well as the 24. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 (noting the Ten Percent Plan's initial success in increasing minority percentages at UT).
25. See id. at 225-26 (acknowledging some undergraduate classes lacked diversity although diversity had increased for the overall student body and noting UT's findings that the Ten Percent Plan did not fully reach UT's educational mission leading it to reinstate its affirmative action plan).
26. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, . Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have all either personally expressed their disagreement with employing a deferential approach when examining race-conscious admissions and assignment plans or voted to invalidate such plans. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743-44 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 764-66 (Thomas, J., concurring) ; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring This article proceeds in three sections. Section I discusses UT's decision to utilize an affirmative action plan in its attempt to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse student body. This Section analyzes the plan itself as well as the Fifth Circuit's majority and concurring opinions upholding the plan's constitutionality. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the UT administrators' judgments and decision making, as called for by Grutter, 5 Judge Emilio Garza's concurring opinion contends that granting such deference when evaluating the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan is inappropriate and "represents a digression in the course of constitutional law."" Section II challenges Judge Garza's contention and argues that when properly viewed as a means by which to inform, rather than to weaken, a strict scrutiny inquiry, affording deference to educators' decision making is an appropriate constitutional principle to apply when examining the constitutionality of race-based admissions plans, such as that employed in Fisher. In doing so, the Court does not abdicate its judicial responsibilities. Rather, it appropriately considers the context and circumstances under which a plan has been adopted and implemented. Such consideration can aid the Court in determining if a university, such as UT, was acting in good faith when deciding to employ a race-based admissions policy to accomplish its academic goals.
In light of the expertise and knowledge needed to craft and implement effective measures to carry out a university's educational mission, Section III urges the Court to defer to UT's decision making concerning not only its asserted compelling interests, but also the narrowly tailored means by which to achieve such interests. In other educational contexts, the Court has advocated for educational autonomy and restrained judicial involvement due to courts' general lack of experience and expertise regarding com- plex academic matters. 3 The complicated, multifaceted decision making involved in assembling a diverse student body, so as to achieve the benefits of diversity, warrants similar restraint. Therefore, as the Court examines the admissions policy challenged in Fisher, this article urges the Court to respect UT's good faith, expert judgment that the consideration of race remains a necessary tool to achieve the benefits of a diverse student body.
I. FISHER: THE "TEXAS TWO-STEP" APPROACH TO ACHIEVING DIVERSITY
In the Supreme Court's reexamination of the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action in higher education, UT once again finds itself center stage in the ongoing debate. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas, which invalidated the University of Texas School of Law's consideration of race in admissions decisions," served as a catalyst for the Court's decision to grant certiorari in Grutter." 3 A decade following the Court's decision in Grutter, which effectively reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood, 34 the Court will once again determine the constitutionality of a university's affirmative action plan. 3 5 However, unlike the plans challenged in Grutter and Gratz, the constitutional inquiry concerning the undergraduate plan challenged in Fisher is potentially complicated by UT's simultaneous operation of a state-mandated percentage plan-a plan that arguably succeeds in achieving some level of student body diversity. 6 Although the Fifth Circuit upheld UT's admissions program, albeit somewhat reluctantly," many affirmative action proponents fear that history will repeat itself and the Court will once again reverse the Fifth Circuit's ruling-only this time invalidating, rather than upholding, the challenged plan. 38 31. See infra Section III. 32. 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) . 33. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003 In accordance with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Hopwood" and the subsequent interpretation issued by the Texas Attorney General prohibiting the consideration of race in public university admissions decisions," UT terminated its affirmative action admissions plan in 1996." 1 In 2005, following the Supreme Court's sanctioning of race-based admissions policies, UT reinstated its affirmative action plan in accordance with the constitutional standards set forth in Grutter. 4 2 Unlike Texas's other flagship university, Texas A&M, which declined to reestablish its racebased admissions program, 4 3 the administrators at UT felt that considering race as one admissions factor among many others would best help to ensure fulfillment of its educational mission. 44 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, the educational goals that UT seeks to accomplish by endeavoring to enroll a critical mass of racially and ethnically diverse students "mirror those approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter." 5 Not only does UT seek to foster understanding between students of different races, 46 aims to "prepare its students to be the leaders of the State of Texas-a role which, given the state's increasingly diverse profile, will require them to be able to lead a multicultural workforce and to communicate policy to a diverse electorate." 47 The Court in Grutter embraced similar social and democratic benefits that are often attributed to diverse learning environments.
4 "
UT's admissions policies employ race-based measures in conjunction with the state-mandated Ten Percent Plan. 49 The Ten Percent Plan, which was the Texas legislature's post-Hopwood attempt to diversify the state's institutions of higher education,°p ermits Texas high school students who graduate in the top ten percent of their class to receive automatic admission into the state's public colleges and universities."' Although enacted as a race-neutral measure to increase diversity, 2 many supporters of race-based affirmative action criticize the Ten Percent Plan and other similar plans, such as those implemented in California and 47. Id. at 225-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 48. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-33 (2003) (identifying 'cross-racial understanding,'" preparation of "'students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,"' and cultivation of "leaders with legitimacy" as three of the educational benefits that can result from creating a diverse academic environment).
49. -Banc_57.pdf (describing the Ten Percent Plan as a "facially race-neutral means to achieve the race-motivated goal of increasing" minority student attendance at UT); see also Forbath & Torres, supra note 23, at 186-88 (discussing the Ten Percent Plan as a raceneutral alternative to achieve diversity); Spann, supra note 27, at 52 (noting that "the Top Ten Percent Plan was treated as if it was race neutral" in Fisher); Thompson & Schiff, supra Florida, 53 for their perceived dependence on "continued racial segregation at the secondary school level" to be effective. 54 While this criticism raises a valid concern, the Ten Percent Plan has contributed to increased racial diversity at UT without specifically considering applicants' race or ethnicity. 5 As detailed in the Fifth Circuit opinion:
In its first year, the Top Ten Percent Law succeeded in increasing minority percentages at UT. African-American enrollment rose from 2.7% to 3.0% and Hispanic enrollment rose from 12.6% to 13.2%. However, the absolute number of minorities remained stable as a result of a smaller freshman class. Over time, both the number and percentage of enrolled Hispanics and African-Americans increased. The entering freshman class of 2004, the last admitted without the Grutter-like plan, was 4.5% African-American (309 students), 16.9% Hispanic (1,149 students), and 17.9% Asian-American (1,218 students) in a class of 6,796 students. 55. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 . But see id. at 243 ("True enough, the Top Ten Percent Law is in a sense, perhaps a controlling sense, a 'facially' race-neutral plan. But it was animated by efforts to increase minority enrollment, and to the extent it succeeds it is because at key points it proxies for race.").
56. Id. at 224; see also id. at 238-39 (acknowledging that although the Ten Percent Plan has helped to increase both African American and Hispanic enrollment, "changing demographics and other minority outreach programs render it difficult to quantify the increases attributable to the Top Ten Percent Law").
Despite the Ten Percent Plan's contribution to the diversification of the student body as a whole, UT's decision to reintroduce race as an admissions factor was predicated on the failure of the Ten Percent Plan and other race-neutral strategies 57 to successfully enroll a "critical mass" of minority students, as such term was envisioned in Grutter. 5 " Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the Law School conceptualized critical mass in terms of "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce," rather than in terms of a specific, numerical goal or target. 59 Therefore, UT's assessment of the Ten Percent Plan's effectiveness in helping UT achieve its academic mission rightfully encompassed more than a consideration of the aforementioned increases in the racial makeup of the student body. Also critical to its examination was whether the increased percentages of minority students successfully brought about the benefits of diversity that UT was seeking. 6 " Unfortunately, UT administrators found this not to be the case."' Notwithstanding the operation of the Ten Percent Plan, UT continued to experience a lack of meaningful racial diversity in most of its undergraduate courses. 6 " For instance, in 2002, eightynine percent of classes enrolling ten to twenty-four students had only one or zero African American students." Forty-six percent of those classes "had one or zero Asian American students, and 43% 57. Following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood, UT implemented several raceneutral alternatives in its attempt to achieve a diverse student body including the establishment of regional admissions centers and the creation of new scholarships targeting first-generation students and students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. had one or zero Hispanic students." 6 4 Considering that an important goal of UT's academic mission is to create diverse classroom environments in which students from different cultural, economic, and racial backgrounds can engage in robust, thoughtprovoking discussions, 6 5 the homogeneity of UT's smaller enrollment courses significantly impeded its ability to achieve this goal.66 Contrary to the petitioner's assertions in Fisher that UT's interest in creating diverse classrooms to facilitate such discussions is neither compelling nor contemplated under Grutter, 6 7 Justice O'Connor recognized that many of the educational benefits associated with diverse academic environments are realized in classroom settings. The Court acknowledged that the benefits of diversity ranging from the promotion of "'cross-racial understanding"' 66 to the elimination of racial stereotypes, are "'important and laudable,' because 'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible variety of backgrounds."' 66 The Ten Percent Plan's failure to enroll a critical mass of minority students prevented such beneficial classroom conversations from taking place, which impeded UT's ability to achieve its educational goals."°T he Ten Percent Plan's ineffectiveness in fulfilling UT's academic mission was also evidenced by UT's disturbing research, which found that undergraduate minority students often felt isolated on campus. 7 In addition, a majority of undergraduates felt that there were too few minority students enrolled in courses to fully experience the benefits of diversity. When coupled with the aforementioned statistics detailing the lack of diversity in many of its courses, these findings prompted UT to restore its affirmative action plan and to include race as a factor among many others when considering applicants who were not admitted under the Ten Percent Plan. 3 In UT's considered judgment, this decision was necessary if the school hoped to realize the educational benefits that flow from a sufficiently diverse student body. 74 Even though UT's reconsideration of race has helped to further diversify its student body, it is this dual employment of both race-based and race-neutral admissions measures that the plaintiffs in Fisher unsuccessfully challenged."5
B. The Role of Deference in the Fifth Circuit's Opinions
Following their denial of undergraduate admission into UT, Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michaelewicz sued UT, alleging that its consideration of race in admissions decisions violated their equal protection rights. 76 While the Fifth Circuit's three-judge panel upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of UT, 77 an examination of the majority and concurring opinions reveals the influential, albeit tenuous, role that deference played in the case.
Writing for the majority, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham began his analysis of the constitutionality of UT's admissions program with the recognition that "a university's educational judgment in developing diversity policies is due deference." 8 As acknowledged by the Fifth Circuit:
Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixedpoint system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.
79
Judge Higginbotham advanced two rationales for deferring to UT's race-based decision making regarding its admissions decisions: (1) the recognition of educational autonomy in higher education, and (2) the complexity of academic judgments involved in making such decisions." In applying strict scrutiny to the challenged plan, the Fifth Circuit was "mindful of a university's academic freedom and the complex educational judgments made when assembling a broadly diverse student body."'" Contrary to assertions advanced by Judge Emilio M. Garza in his concurring opinion, such mindfulness did not result in Judge Higginbotham subjecting UT's affirmative action plan to a "less demanding" level of strict scrutiny. 2 Rather, in accordance with the contextual application of strict scrutiny as set forth in Grutter, 83 the Fifth Circuit carefully examined whether UT's decision to implement a race-based measure was narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling educational goals.
Although the plaintiffs argued that UT's consideration of race was not narrowly tailored because of the purported effectiveness of the race-neutral Ten Percent Plan, 85 at 240 ('The reality is that the Top Ten Percent Law alone does not perform well in pursuit of the diversity Grutter endorsed and is in many ways at war with it."); id. at 245 ("If a plaintiff produces evidence that calls into question a university's good faith pursuit of those educational benefits, its race-conscious admissions policies may be found unconstitutional. We are not persuaded, however, that any of the benchmarks suggested by Appellants succeed at calling that judgment into question."); id. at 240-42, 245-achieving the benefits of diversity sought by UT, the Court reasoned that the automatic admission feature of the Ten Percent Plan prevented UT from engaging in the sort of holistic, individualized review of applicants that Grutter endorses. 7 The operation of the Ten Percent Plan had also resulted in the concentration of minority students in certain academic programs, which, according to the court, "limit[ed] the beneficial effects of educational diversity" that are achieved through students' varied interactions on a more widespread basis. 8 8 In rejecting plaintiffs' contention that UT had achieved a critical mass of diverse students, thereby negating its need to employ a race-based admissions program, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence to call into question UT's educational judgment that it had not "attain[ed] a critical mass of underrepresented minority students." 89 The court reasoned that absent evidence to the contrary, it was permitted to find that in reintroducing race as an admissions factor, UT had engaged in a constitutionally permissible, good faith pursuit of the educational benefits associated with diverse learning environments. 90 In his concurring opinion, Judge Garza denounced the majority's Grutter-like approach to examining the constitutionality of race-based admissions policies. Although he voted with the majority to uphold UT's plan, Judge Garza wrote separately to express his "belief that Grutter represents a digression in the course of constitutional law." 9 ' Similar to criticisms raised by Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars, 9 " Judge Garza argued that the Court in Grutter failed to properly apply strict scrutiny when examining the Law School's affirmative action plan. 93 In particular, he took issue with the Court's decision to defer to university ad- ministrators' educational judgments regarding their need to utilize race-based measures to pursue racial diversity.
94 Judge Garza contended the Grutter Court erred when "it conflated the deference owed to a university's asserted interest with deference to the means used to attain it." 9 Sections II and III of this article challenge Judge Garza's contention and argue that affording an appropriate degree of deference to a university's academic judgments-regarding both its educational interest and the racebased means by which to achieve it-is both consistent with and called for under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
II. DEFERENCE AND STRICT SCRUTINY: THE COEXISTENCE OF COMPLIMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Those who disagree with the deferential approach adopted in Grutter often view deference as a means by which to supplant or weaken the strict scrutiny inquiry. 96 They appear to consider the affordance of deference and the application of strict scrutiny as an "either or" proposition, thereby foreclosing the possibility that each principle can coexist with the other when both are properly applied. 9 7 This section advocates for the reconsideration of this position. It argues that rather than as a means by which to weaken or abrogate its strict scrutiny analysis, the Court should view deference as a means by which to inform its inquiry, thereby making it an appropriate constitutional principle to apply when examining educators' race-based decision making, such as that at issue in Fisher. 95. Id. at 257; see also id. at 250-51 (arguing that Grutter's affordance of deference essentially negates strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement that universities give serious, good faith consideration to feasible race-neutral alternatives); id. at 253 (citation omitted) ("[Tihe Court's unusual deference to educators' academic judgments that racial diversity is a compelling interest, coupled with the deference allegedly owed to their determination of when the use of race is no longer necessary, would appear to permit racebased policies indefinitely.").
96. See, e.g., id . at 247 (contending that the level of scrutiny applied in Grutter was "markedly less demanding" than strict scrutiny); Ayres & Foster, supra note 12, at 581 n.223 (arguing that the deference shown in Grutter is inconsistent with the goals of strict scrutiny); Crump, supra note 9, at 492 ("Somewhat oxymoronically, the Court asserted that this deference did not mean that its scrutiny would be any less strict.").
97. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 9, at 492.
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A. Grutter's Critique
In examining the constitutionality of the affirmative action plan challenged in Grutter, the Court respected the Law School's academic judgment that a diverse student body was vital to achieving its educational goals 9 8 and found that the administrators were acting in good faith when utilizing a race-based admissions plan in their pursuit of student body diversity. 99 In so doing,
Justice O'Connor deferred to the Law School's judgments and decision making regarding both its educational mission and the means by which to accomplish it. 0 0 In upholding student body diversity as a compelling interest, the Court relied on arguments presented by both the Law School and its supporting amici curiae detailing the academic, social, and democratic benefits that can be achieved by educating students in a diverse learning environment.' In holding that the Law School's admissions plan was narrowly tailored to further this interest, the Court found that the plan utilized race or ethnicity as a permissible "'plus' factor" 0 2 and afforded "individualized consideration" to each applicant. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232 (asserting that the majority in Grutter held that "the narrow-tailoring inquiry-like the compelling-interest inquiry-is undertaken with a degree of deference to the University's constitutionally protected, presumably expert academic judgment"); id. at 257 (Garza, J., concurring) (expressing concern that Grutter "conflated the deference owed to a university's asserted interest with deference to the means used to attain it"); Blumstein, supra note 52, at 72 (noting that the Court deferred to the Law School "both in terms of determining what constituted a compelling interest (student body diversity) and in terms of analyzing how the narrow-tailoring component of meansends scrutiny worked under strict scrutiny"); Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost of the "Split Double Header" of Gratz and Grutter, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 604 (2003) Justice O'Connor's fellow Justices voiced similar criticisms in their dissenting opinions. 1 07 For Justices Thomas and Kennedy in particular, the Court's affordance of deference was especially disconcerting. Justice Thomas described the Court's grant of deference as "unprecedented" and "inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."" 8 He argued that the Court deferred to the Law School's judgments "without serious inquiry and without regard to the applicable legal standard." 9 Justice Kennedy shared these concerns.' While he agreed that the Court was permitted to defer to the Law School's educational mission,"' deference was "not to be given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued."" 2 Absent a searching inquiry in-to the Law School's methodology, argued Justice Kennedy, the Court could not ensure that the administrators' consideration of race met constitutional standards. 11 3 Inherent in Justice Kennedy's criticisms, as well as those advanced by others, is the contention that " [d] eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it."" 4 As asserted by Professor James Blumstein, "[t]he critical ingredient of strict scrutiny is the lack of deference given to governmental decisions that trigger strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires 'detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means."" 5 These assertions seemingly preclude the possibility that a court can simultaneously engage in such a detailed and rigorous examination while affording some degree of deference to educators' decisions and justifications." 6 If courts utilize deference not as a means to engage in an unexamined, automatic approval of universities' race-based admissions policies, but rather as a means to examine the context and circumstances under which schools have adopted and implemented such plans, they can in fact succeed in engaging in a strict scrutiny analysis that is complimented, rather than circumvented, by an affordance of deference.
B. The Contextualizing Function of Deference
Those who disagree with courts deferring to a university's racebased decision making suggest that deference allows courts to replace their own judgments and conclusions regarding the constitutionality of a university's actions with those offered by the institution itself."' Admittedly, using deference in such a way so as (2007) ("In keeping with his view that strict scrutiny should not apply, Justice Breyer repeatedly urges deference to local school boards on these issues."); id. at 766 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("To adopt the dissent's deferential approach would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities."). But see id. at 848 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Gliving some degree of weight to a local school board's knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial scrutiny.").
117. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)) (asserting that Grutter's affordance of deference amounted to an "abandonment or abdication of judicial review"); Paul J. Beard II, The Legacy of Grutter: How the Meredith and PICS Courts Wrongly Extended the "Educational to rubber stamp a university's race-based admission plan would run counter to the detailed examination that strict scrutiny requires. Therefore, this article advocates for a different concept of deference--one that helps courts formulate their own conclusions about the constitutionality of administrators' race-based decisions, rather than simply accepting those drawn by the educational institutions themselves.
Courts should defer to educators' race-based decision making when considering the background and circumstances that led to such decisions. Affording deference for this purpose can aid courts in determining if a university, such as UT, was acting in good faith when deciding to employ a race-based admissions policy to accomplish its educational goals. Considering that "context matters" 1 ' 8 when courts examine the constitutionality of race-based governmental decision making, utilizing deference to assess good faith can be properly understood as a facet of courts' strict scrutiny analysis, rather than its antithesis.
Central to the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence is the inherent suspiciousness of race-based governmental decision making.' According to the Court, the harms that racial classifications can inflict on individuals and groups necessitate a "searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures." 2° While the Grutter Court was certainly mindful that injuries can result from race-based decisions, 2 ' it also Benefits" Exception to the Equal Protection Clause in Public Higher Education, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 26 (2006) ("The Grutter Court accepted that diversity was a compelling state interest because, quite simply, the Law School said so."); Varol, supra note 100, at 1257 ("The Court should have drawn its independent conclusions from the evidence, rather than deferring to the law school's blanket statements. In the end, the Court's independent conclusions may have been the same as the law school's, but the Court had the constitutional duty to reach them on its own."); id. at 1263 ("Thus, allowing universities to play a role in policing the constitutionality of their own actions while the courts take a back seat amounts to constitutional abdication. . . ."). Those recognized that "[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." 1 2 2 As the Court endeavors to ascertain UT's reasons for reintroducing race as an admissions factor, affording a degree of deference to administrators' judgments and rationales can help inform the Court's understanding of the context in which the race-based decision was made.
123
As noted by the Fifth Circuit, UT has engaged in efforts to assemble a diverse student body to fulfill its educational mission for over twenty years.
12 Considering that the Justices lack experience in developing and implementing effective college admissions strategies, it is difficult for the Court to fully appreciate and understand the multitude of factors impacting such efforts. 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011 ) ("Considering UT's admissions system in its historical context, it is evident that the efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of high purpose, lending support to a constitutionally protected zone of discretion.").
124. Fisher, No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2012) 2012 WL 3540398, at *7-8 ("By 2025, the year in which children who are entering kindergarten this year will graduate from high school, over half of all children will be Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, or multiracial, and over 42% of the overall population will be from these historically minority racial and ethnic groups.").
127. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 127-29 (2012) , available at http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/contentlarticles/2012/07/Brown-Nagin65_VandL_Rev_En_Banc_113.pdf.
128. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 223 (discussing UT's implementation of scholarship programs targeting minority students); see also Torres, supra note 23, at 1599 (acknowledging the importance of targeted financial aid, recruitment, and outreach in assembling a diverse student body).
Latinos, 1 2 9 also affects its ability to assemble a diverse student body. 130 Examining the interplay between these and numerous other factors affecting student body composition enabled UT to gain certain knowledge and expertise regarding student body enrollment that the Court does not possess. UT relied on this knowledge in formulating its judgment that, notwithstanding the Ten Percent Plan, reintroducing race as a factor in admissions decisions was necessary to achieve its academic mission of educating students in a diverse learning environment.' In deferring to UT's judgment, the Court should not only acknowledge UT's expertise regarding these multifaceted educational matters," 2 but should also draw upon this expertise to inform its own judgment regarding the constitutionality of UT's race-based decision making.
As instructed in Grutter, the Court must examine the sincerity of UT's rationales for considering race in its admissions decisions. " 3 It must determine whether UT acted in good faith or with ill intent in adopting a race-based admissions policy.' Affording a degree of deference to UT's offered reasons can aid the Court in making this determination, and deference can further the Court's understanding of the educational goals UT is attempting to accomplish by considering race as well as the challenges IT must 131. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225-26; Respondents Brief, supra note 57, at 10-11. 132. See Am. Council on Educ. Brief, supra note 117, at 30 ("Deference is owed educators' educationally derived conceptions of diversity because such matters require evaluation of cumulative information for which those responsible for higher education are best qualified.").
133. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) . 134. See id. at 335.
face and overcome in order to do so. Having a greater understanding and awareness of the reasons that precipitated UT's racebased decision making will help contextualize UT's decision, which will aid the Court in its strict scrutiny analysis.
Although Justice O'Connor stated that the Court can "presum[e] good faith of university officials in the absence of a showing to the contrary," 3 ' the Court should not blindly accept or solely rely on school officials' reasoning when examining the constitutionality of a race-based admissions plan. Rather, it should also consult other sources such as amicus briefs, social science reports, research findings, and the like as it engages in a rigorous examination of the plan's goals and means. The Supreme Court in Grutter and the Fifth Circuit in Fisher succeeded in conducting such an examination. 1 36
Although both courts deferred to the universities' judgments,' 37 they also engaged in a thorough and exacting review of both the asserted educational goals and the race-based means by which to achieve them. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor relied on amici curiae and expert reports to substantiate the "Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits." 8 ' While the Court's compelling interest holding was undoubtedly informed by the Law School's judgment,' 39 the Court's reliance on arguments presented in amicus briefs and research studies evidences its unwillingness to simply accept the Law School's judgment as its own. In Fisher, the Fifth Circuit found UT's compelling interest to be essentially indistinguishable from the diversity rationale approved in Grutter. 4° In reaching this conclusion, the court, after a 135. Id. at 343 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
136. Although the Fifth Circuit did not cite to any of the nine amicus briefs filed in Fisher, it did consider empirical research findings in its examination of the UT's assertion that notwithstanding the operation of the Ten Percent Plan, it had not achieved a critical mass of minority students. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d at 213, 225, 240-41, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2011). 137. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."); Fisher, 631 F.3d. at 231 ("[A] university's educational judgment in developing diversity policies is due deference.").
138. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 330-32. 139. See id. at 329 ("Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission.. . See Fisher, meticulous examination, rejected plaintiffs' claim that UT was motivated by an impermissible interest in racial balancing rather than the benefits of diversity.141
140.
With regards to strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement, Justice O'Connor identified and evaluated several features that a race-based plan must have in order to be deemed constitutional.' 42 As noted by Professor Tomiko Brown-Nagin, such features include the following: 1) does not employ quotas; 2) does not insulate categories of applicants from competition with one another; 3) treats race as a mere plus factor in the evaluative process; 4) does not unduly burden disfavored groups; 5) is implemented after good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives; and 6) includes a durational limit. 265, 315, 317 (1978) ).
143. Brown-Nagin, supra note 127, at 119 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 339, 341-42).
144. See Fisher, 145. See id. at 247 ("The admissions procedures that UT adopted, modeled after the plan approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter, are narrowly tailored .... ").
146. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority in Grutter "abandoned" strict scrutiny and failed to apply it in the case).
147. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 148. See, e.g., Fisher, 631 F.3d at 252 n.3 (Garza, J., concurring) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 295 (2003)) ("I do not believe the government's use of race in university admissions can ever serve a compelling interest. .. ."); Ayres & Foster, supra note 12,  at 566-70. date racial affirmative action."' 49 Unlike Justice Thomas, who has openly expressed his contempt for race-based decision making in the educational context, 15 ' Justice Kennedy subtly alludes to his disapproval of affirmative action plans by blaming the Court's affordance of deference for the loss of "talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways to ensure individual consideration.""' He sends a somewhat stronger message when he speaks of "the necessity for scrutiny that is real, not feigned, where the corrosive category of race is a factor in decisionmaking.""'
If it is true that Justice Kennedy and others subscribe to the view that the use of racial preferences in governmental decision making is per se unconstitutional, then they should refrain from using deference as a constitutional scapegoat by which to invalidate such decisions. Doing so unjustly hinders the recognition of deference as a valid constitutional principle that, when properly applied, can serve as a useful tool by which to illuminate the strict scrutiny framework rather than to dismantle it.
Although deference can further a court's understanding of the contexts in which educators engage in race-based decision making, the question remains whether it is an appropriate principle to apply to both prongs of a strict scrutiny analysis. While jurists such as Justice Kennedy and Judge Garza support the Court's affordance of deference when conducting a compelling interest inquiry,"' they contend that deference has no place when the inquiry turns to narrow tailoring."' The next section challenges this contention and argues that-in light of the expertise and knowledge needed to craft and implement effective measures to carry out a university's educational mission-the Court should defer to UT's good faith decision making concerning not only its 149. Spann, supra note 27, at 48. 150. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) asserted compelling interests, but also the narrowly tailored means by which to achieve such interests.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXPERTISE IN FISHER
Both the Court in Grutter and the Fifth Circuit in Fisher grounded their willingness to defer to universities' decision making in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence respecting educators' autonomy and expertise in making academic-related decisions.' 5 5
When upholding school officials' decision making in both the K-12 and higher education contexts, the Court has often taken into account educational autonomy and educators' considerable knowledge and experience regarding complicated academic matters. 5 ' Considering that Fisher involves "complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university," the Court should continue this practice when examining UT's educational mission as well as the means employed to achieve it.' 57
A. Educational Autonomy and Compelling Interest
As previously discussed, the Court in Grutter deferred to the Law School's judgment when examining whether student body diversity constituted a compelling governmental interest.' 5 8 Central to Justice O'Connor's reasoning for doing so was the Court's jurisprudence recognizing the importance of educational autonomy and institutional academic freedom. 1 59
Although an arguably amorphous concept, 6 1 the constitutional theory of academic freedom is considered to be rooted in the First Amendment 6 ' and was born out of the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of public education institutions to American society.' 62 Such recognition is evident in cases such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire' 63 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,1" both of which laid the groundwork for the Court's acknowledgment of educational autonomy in Grutter.' 161. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment...."); MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 8 (2009) ("The constitutional law of academic freedom appeals to the First Amendment as a restriction on the capacity of governments to regulate universities and as a constraint on the authority of state universities to control their faculty."); Byrne, supra note 160, at 252 ("The First Amendment protects academic freedom."); Paul Horowitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 481-494 (2005) (discussing the historical development of "the constitutional understanding of academic freedom as a First Amendment value").
162. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S 234, 250 (1957) ; id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) REV. 217, 254 (2011) ; Krell, supra note 162, at 278-80; Jeltema, supra note 160, at 237-39. But see Horowitz, supra note 161, at 483 (arguing that the plurality opinion in Sweezy should not be read as the Court's general endorsement of governmental deference to university decision making).
In Sweezy, the Court reversed a state court's ruling that held a university lecturer in contempt of court for violating a state statute that sought to eradicate "subversive persons," including public school teachers and professors, from state government employment.' 6 6 In his influential opinion, Justice Frankfurter warned "against the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university."' He agreed with scholars who declared:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
In Bakke, Justice Powell relied upon these freedoms in affirming the pursuit of student body diversity as a constitutionally permissible goal. 16 In so doing, he not only articulated the diversity rationale, 7° which has served as the cornerstone for racebased decision making in higher education, " ' but also acknowl- The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation"--so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the "nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure" to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. Id. at 312-13. For further discussion of these and other benefits associated with student body diversity, see Brief While universities are permitted to exercise this freedom by establishing student body diversity as an educational goal, this freedom is not unlimited. As Justice Powell noted, "[a]lthough a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded." 1 7 4 Justice O'Connor heeded this instruction as she examined the challenged plan in Grutter1 7 5 In so doing, she continued the Court's "tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits"-a tradition that the Court should adhere to in Fisher. 76 Similar to the Law School's compelling interest in Grutter, UT seeks to achieve the benefits of a diverse student body.
In Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grutter, he remarked that "[i]n the context of university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical data known to us." 18° He approved of Justice Powell's reliance in Bakke on "a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university's conception of its educational mission. " 1 81 Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Fisher, Judge Garza acknowledged that "[s]tate universities are free to define their educational goals as broadly as needed to serve the public interest. We defer to educators' professional judgments in setting those goals."' 82 If deference is an appropriate constitutional principle to apply when evaluating the constitutionality of UT's compelling interest, then so should it also be when determining the constitutionality of the measures employed to achieve such interest; it is this work, rather than the formulation of the interest itself, that necessitates the sort of multifaceted judgments that educators, as opposed to judges, are uniquely poised to make.
B. Educational Expertise and Narrow Tailoring
Central to the Court's examination in Fisher will be whether UT needs to employ race-based admissions measures given the amount of racial diversity achieved, in part, by the Ten Percent Plan.' 83 While consideration of this issue potentially implicates both the compelling interest and narrow tailoring components of strict scrutiny,' the Court is likely to focus its inquiry on whether UT's use of race-based policies is narrowly tailored to further its educational goals. 5 The Court should defer to UT's chosen methods to carry out its academic mission because, more so than 180. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 181. Id. at 387. 182. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 256-57 (Garza, J., concurring). 183. See Harpalani, supra note 59, at 518 ("The substantive question [in Fisher] is whether race-conscious policies are needed to attain the educational benefits of diversity, given that a race-neutral policy (the Top Ten Percent Law) has increased diversity."); see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
184. Although the Court in Grutter recognized student body diversity as a compelling interest to justify the use of race-based admissions plans, the Petitioner in Fisher argues that UT seeks greater classroom diversity rather than student body diversity, which, according to the Petitioner, is not a permissible compelling interest under Grutter. See Petitioner Brief, supra note 23, at 29-30. But see Spann, supra note 27, at 53 (arguing that classroom diversity is a constitutionally permissible component of student body diversity).
185. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 127, at 117-18. crafting the mission itself, the implementation of effective admissions policies, whereby UT can actually achieve its mission, requires the sort of academic expertise and experience that educators traditionally possess rather than judges.'
Due to the inherent limitations of courts to fully understand and evaluate the myriad factors that administrators must consider when making academic decisions, the Supreme Court has advocated for judicial restraint when reviewing such decisions187 in cases such ., suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions-decisions that require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.'"). The Court's line of desegregation cases encouraging local control of school districts also recognizes educators' ability to effectively evaluate academic policies and their consequences. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Federal courts do not possess the capabilities of state and local governments in addressing difficult educational problems."); id. at 131-32 ("State and local school officials not only bear the responsibility for educational decisions, they also are better equipped than a single federal judge to make the day-to-day policy, curricular, and funding choices necessary to bring a school district into compliance with the Constitution. REV. 111, 134 (2008) (discussing the interrelatedness of local control and deference to educators' decision making in the K-12 context). However, the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 declined to rely on such reasoning when asked to defer to school districts' judgments that race-based student assignment plans were necessary to achieve the benefits of a diverse student body. 551 U. S. 701, 744-45 (2007) . But see id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe only that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in one America.").
188. denied a student's appeal of her dismissal from a medical program."' In both cases, the Court found that the universities had not acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in deciding to dismiss the students and, therefore, had not violated the students' due process rights.' 9 2
Inherent in the universities' decisions to dismiss the students were academic judgments regarding merit, performance, and fitness.' 93 Arriving at such decisions entails "expert evaluation" of a multitude of issues-issues for which courts may lack requisite information and experience to effectively evaluate.'
94
The Grutter Court relied on similar reasoning when deciding to defer to the Law School's judgment that the consideration of race was a necessary measure by which to achieve its educational mission.' 95 The Court recognized that educational decisions concerning student body composition involve complex academic judgments that are greatly informed by universities' considerable experience and expertise.' 9 6 As noted by the amici curiae in Fisher:
How, for example, the mix of students affects learning involves considerations educators are best equipped to gauge. Such judgments require knowledge of campus and classroom dynamics, cognitive processes, and ways to nurture students' capacity for moral reasoning, along with other specialized knowledge in which educators are trained. These "complex educational judgments" lie "primarily within the expertise of the university." 197 Such considerations should inform the Fisher Court's decision to defer to UT's considered judgment that the consideration of race, as one of many admissions factors, continues to be necessary to achieve its educational mission, notwithstanding the operation of the Ten Percent Plan.
As evidenced by the Fifth Circuit's detailed discussion of UT's admissions policies, crafting and implementing effective admissions procedures are very involved endeavors that are multifaceted and require a great deal of knowledge and skill.' 9 For instance, to arrive at an admissions decision, UT administrators employ both Academic Index ("AI") and a Personal Achievement Index ("PAI") computations.' 9 9 The Al score is "based on the student's high school class rank, standardized test scores, and the extent to which the applicant exceeded UT's required high school curriculum." 2°0 The PAI score considers applicants' "leadership qualities; extracurricular activities; awards/honors; work experience; service to school or community; and special circumstances." 20 ' Prior to UT's reconsideration of race, special circumstances included, among other factors, the socioeconomic status of the applicant's family and school, whether languages other than English were spoken in the home, and whether the applicant lived in a single-parent home. 2 " 2 The fact that the PAI score is determined, in part, by "specially trained readers , " 20 who score two essays written by applicants, evidences the knowledge and expertise needed to make informed admissions decisions. 0 4 Such skill and experience are also necessary because admissions efforts encompass more than making a decision regarding whether or not to admit a particular student, although such decisions are obviously integral components of all admissions procedures. Assembling a diverse student body that furthers a university's educational goals also involves the development and implementation of effective recruitment strategies to encourage underrepresented students to apply and to persuade admitted students to enroll.
2 0 5 As previously discussed, the availability of scholarships and financial aid for minority students is another crucial element to achieving a diverse student population.°6
UT has employed several race-neutral admissions measures in their attempt to increase minority student enrollment. Such measures include the establishment of new regional admissions offices in areas with student populations that do not traditionally feed into UT, as well as the awarding of scholarships to students who come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. 2 7 The fact that despite these efforts-the consideration of PAI factors and the implementation of the Ten Percent Plan-UT, in its considered judgment, 2 8 had not produced a sufficiently diverse student body that allowed it to achieve its educational mission evidences the complexities and challenges involved in university admissions. 2 9 In deciding to supplement the Ten Percent Plan with a racebased admissions policy, UT seeks to achieve the educational, social, and democratic benefits that are often associated with diverse student bodies. 210 However, UT, like all universities, faces a multitude of challenges when attempting to achieve this educational mission. 1 ' The scope of such challenges ranges from achievement gap and pipeline issues created, in part, by K-12 inequities 212 to voluntary separation and isolation by students on college campuses such that there is minimal cross-racial interaction. 13 School policymakers, not judges, are in the best position to assess such challenges and to craft effective measures, including race-based admissions policies, that are designed to overcome them. As Professor Brown-Nagin has noted, "the Grutter Court expressly vested considerable discretion in educational authorities precisely because they are closest to the problems associated with diversifying campus life." 21' The years of study, reconsideration, and modification that UT administrators have engaged in regarding their admissions policies have equipped them with the requisite knowledge and expertise to address these and other challenges that may impede the achievement of their educational goals. As instructed by Grutter, when examining the constitutionality of UT's current admissions plan, the Supreme Court should afford a degree of deference to UT's judgments regarding both its educational goals and the measures needed to achieve them. 2 16 Doing so would not only be in keeping with the Court's prior recognition of institutional autonomy, but would also greatly enhance the Court's own understanding and judgment regarding UT's continued need to consider race in its admissions decisions to achieve its educational goals.
CONCLUSION
For more than six decades the Supreme Court has played an instrumental role in helping to provide equal educational opportunities for minority students. In cases ranging from Sweatt v.
Painter to Grutter, the Court has endeavored to ensure that students of color have equal access to institutions of higher education. 17 Considering that universities are often regarded as "gateways to leadership in American institutions," 2 8 the Fisher Court should defer to UT's autonomy and expert judgments as UT crafts and implements measures to open its doors to a greater number of underrepresented, minority students.
